China and Russia after the invasion of Ukraine

Zenel Garcia and Kevin Modlin write in the current Autumn issue of the US Army War College's journal Parameters on the implications of the Ukraine-Russia war for the China-Russia relationship. (Sino-Russian Relations and the War in Ukraine 07/28/2022)

The invasion of February 24 obviously puts Russia in a position of greater dependence on China. But Garcia and Modlin look at some important features of that alignment, which in general favors China's international position though it also comes with significant risks.

China has been using the war to position China as a "nonhegemonic international actor" in the Global South nations, a powerful country that has benefits to offer but without the dangers those nations often associate with the United States. They have been warning that the US in its position against Russia in Ukraine is operating from a "Cold War mentality". They are presenting China as a champion of developing countries while portraying the US as a source of instability.

They do identify new challenges for China this situation presents. China has been presenting itself as a defender of nonintervention and of national independence and development as state in their Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. But China's unwillingness to straightforwardly condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine does at least partially contradict that position.

China has a long common border with Russia and a big interest in stability in Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan that both gives them an interest in good relations with Russia but also carries risks if Russia pursues interventionist policies.

Garcia and Modlin also note that development with Russia and Ukraine have been offering new opportunities for the economic relationships between China and Russia:

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 provided another opportunity for China. The resulting Western sanctions left Moscow with few options except to turn to Beijing for investment. Consequently, Chinese investments in critical Russian economic sectors that had stalled due to the latter’s informal barriers were approved. The outcome of the Power of Siberia Pipeline benefited from this delay, given the crisis allowed China to negotiate a lower price for gas purchases. The sanctions also facilitated China’s involvement in the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in northern Russia. As a Carnegie Endowment report suggests, “due to the impact of Western sanctions,” China’s share in the Yamal LNG project increased to 30 percent. This Chinese investment endeavor allowed Russian resources to commit to liquified natural gas and the pipeline project. [my emphasis]

And they note that this situation means, "Due to the war in Ukraine, Russia is likely to become more reliant on Chinese investments. In time, China may face diminishing returns and the choices it currently faces on Belt and Road Initiative partnerships."

They discuss this in a section on risks for China. But it seems that for the foreseeable future, this part of the relationship is mainly an opportunity for China, unless they become excessively dependent on Russian oil and gas or get stuck with big financial risks. They also describe some of the methods China has to offer financial support to Russia, although they have to be managed against the risks of clashing with Western (particularly US) sanctions.

But they also stress that the Russia-China relationship:

.. is not predicated on deeply shared politics or economics. Instead, it hinges on how the two countries independently and jointly want to operate in the international system, which contrasts with how neither side viewed the other as a legitimate actor after the Sino-Soviet split.

As they also describe it as China and Russia having common interests but more limited commitments to common action. China-Russia is not a Eurasian NATO.

In this vein, they caution US policymakers against viewing that relationship in a simplistic Cold War manner, the very sort of problem that resulted in Washington taking years to fully appreciate the significant of the Sino-Soviet split that was in full view during the early 1960s:

In the context of the deterioration of US-Chinese relations in recent years, Beijing’s position is increasingly viewed [by the US] as pro-Moscow and a sign of authoritarian unity against the “rules-based” international order. This view fundamentally oversimplifies Sino-Russian relations and fails to account for the impact the Ukrainian invasion might have on them. [my emphasis] 

Here it's not at all a simple matter of polemics to note that the image of a solid, threatening bloc of China and Russia against "the West," or a variation of it in the form of democracy-vs.-autocracy may not serve the national interest of the US or the need for peace and cooperation on global threats. But it is very convenient for the more short-term perspective of the military-industrial complex.