European "Peace" and "Justice" Alignments on the Russia-Ukraine War

Here's another piece from June 15 on the Russia-Ukraine from June from another safely establishment institution, the European Council on Foreign Relations (EFCR): Peace versus Justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine by Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard.

It's a report on the results of a public opinion survey by ECFR aimed at measuring the commitment of Europeans to supporting Ukraine in the current war against the Russia invasion.

As the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. observed, "Most wars are popular in their first thirty days." (The Imperial Presidency 2004). But few wars look as glorious to the public when they drag on for months or years. So many people got sick of the First World War that at the end, four major empires went out of existence: the Russian, the German, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires. Even on the winning side, the American public by the 1930s had generally come to think the war was a largely unnecessary one promoted by the "merchants of death," now better known as the military-industrial complex,

The results at the time of the survey won't be surprising to people who have followed the war news this year:

Overall, Europeans do not hesitate about which side they are on: they want Ukraine to prevail. And they are ready to help it defend itself.

Moreover, ECFR’s new poll shows that most Europeans are ready to demonstrate solidarity with Ukraine, in the form of providing economic assistance, sending arms, supporting Ukrainian membership of the EU, and accepting refugees. At the same time, they also back tough measures against Russia, including applying economic sanctions, ending fossil fuel imports, and deploying troops to eastern Europe (but not to Ukraine itself).

As the title of the report indicates, Krastev and Leonard describe two main camps of opinion, the "peace" camp whose primary concern is to see the war end sooner rather than later, "even if it means Ukraine making concessions," and a "justice" camp who think "the most important goal is to punish Russia for its aggression and to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine – even if such a road leads to protracted conflict and more human suffering."

While that seems to be a useful way to define the two camps, they are inevitably somewhat fluid. In general, anyone in their right mind would prefer to see war end sooner rather than later. But how and when a war like this ends involves a lot of factors. And any resolution of the war will involve some kind of conditions and concessions, except in the unlikely event that Russia just rolls over all of Ukraine and the Ukrainian resistance completely collapses.

They provide the following pie-chart graph of the results:

It's striking that fully 43% of the respondents didn't align clearly with either the Peace or Justice camps.

This is an interesting observation about the political perspectives involved:

While some pro-Russian (or anti-American) voters might be part of the Peace camp, this does not necessarily make the Peace camp a Russia-friendly grouping. While both Peace and Justice camps agree that Russia and Ukraine will each be worse off as a result of this war, the Justice camp believes Russia above all will be “much worse off” – while Peace camp members foresee that, of the two, Ukraine will suffer more. Some in the Peace camp may therefore want the war to end because they consider it is inflicting excessive suffering on Ukraine. [my emphasis]

One suspects that some triumphalist fantasies are involved for many of those assuming that Russia will be more hurt by the war than Ukraine:

Military matters also generate considerable disagreement. The three groups disagree over whether to enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The Justice camp and Swing voters support such a proposition (by 54-24 per cent and 41-23 per cent respectively), while the Peace camp is sceptical (48-25 per cent). The question of sending troops to Ukraine also divides opinion: the Justice camp and Swing voters support it (52-32 per cent and 49-31 per cent respectively), while the Peace camp is opposed (59-24 per cent). [my emphasis]

I hope that this means that the survey didn't specify that "no-fly zone" means direct military conflict between US-NATO and Russian forces. Because if did include that explanation, it means a disturbingly large percentage of the respondents were delusional.

In terms of enthusiasm for Ukraine's cause by country - to the extent the survey meaningfully reflects that - the results for Romania was the only real surprise for me:

In trying to imagine the future divisions in Europe caused by the war, analysts often refer to an “east-west divide” and to differences between frontline countries and those geographically farther from the conflict. ECFR’s study suggests a much more nuanced map. It reveals, for example, significant differences between Poland and Romania, both frontline countries that are hosting large numbers of refugees and that are historically suspicious of, and hostile to, Russia.

Even if both Poland and Romania border Ukraine and their governments are among Kyiv’s major supporters, their citizens display quite distinct attitudes to the war. Eighty-three per cent of people in Poland blame Russia for the conflict; in Romania, just 58 per cent do. Even more importantly, 74 per cent of people in Poland see Russia as the biggest obstacle to peace, while only 42 per cent in Romania do. [my emphasis]