Cold War nostalgia binge over Ukraine?

The PBS Newshour on Thursday featured an AP story on Russian threats this way:

Russia sends troops to Kazakhstan to help quell domestic protests. Russia has a buildup of troops on Ukraine's border. Now Russia's threatening to send military assets to Cuba and Venezuela. Serious and risky threats, mixed with bluff and Cold-War-like melodrama.

The PBS/AP report gives this background:

Ryabkov’s comments mark the first time during the current tensions over Ukraine when a senior official mentioned the possibility of Russian military deployments to the Western hemisphere.

In December 2018, Russia briefly dispatched a pair of its nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela in a show of support for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro amid Western pressure.

Soon after his first election in 2000, Putin ordered the closure of a Russian electronic surveillance facility in Cuba during a period of rapprochement with the West, but Moscow has intensified contacts with Cuba in recent years as tensions with the U.S. and its allies mounted.

The Biden-Harris Administration didn't initially join in the melodramatic posturing over the Cuba-and-Venezuela talk: "A State Department spokesperson told WLRN the Biden Administration is 'not going to respond to bluster. If Russia actually started moving in that direction, we would deal with it decisively'." (U.S. pledges "decisive" response if Russia deploys military in Cuba, Venezuela over Ukraine crisis WLRN Miami 01/13/2021)

Russia may do something destructive in Ukraine, which may or may not be consistent with a realistic view of Russian national interest at the moment. (Which it almost certainly would not be.)

It's likely that what we're seeing is a re-set of some kind in US and NATO relations with Russia. It's worth remembering that however happy Vladimir Putin and the Russian government may have been to have Donald Trump create a mess in American government and politics, it's hard to see how the Trump Administration enhanced Russia's interests in foreign policy in any major way. Aside, of course, from what real security slips clowns and bad actors like onetime Trump National Security Advisor Mike Flynn may have created.

So part of this is surely an attempt by Putin's government to test how a reasonably functioning US government would deal with challenges from Russia, especially ones have to do with the easter European security situation.

As Anatol Lieven has recently noted (Don’t kick the can: two key US proposals for upcoming Russia talks Responsible Statecraft 01/07/2022):

Despite certain positive signs of new thinking, the dominant desire among most U.S. officials appears to be essentially to continue the existing American policy of kicking the can of U.S.-Russia relations down the road; that is to say, try to avoid new clashes, but do not try to reach any concrete agreements or solve any of the key issues at stake.

If U.S. negotiators approach the talks in Geneva in this spirit, then their intention will be to soothe Russian feelings with vague bromides and commitments to further talks. The Biden administration may also use the supposed need to include Ukraine in talks and reach a consensus with the EU and NATO allies as an excuse not to move towards any concrete agreements. This approach has run its course. It is clear from the latest Russian demarche that the Russian government will simply not accept a relationship with the West that continues along these lines. [my emphasis]

Sometimes muddling along is the best that countries can do in international relations. And muddling along is almost always preferable to war. And getting to more stable long-terms solutions is generally preferable.

Samuel Charap calls attention to the problematic can-kicking of the Cheney-Bush Administration in 2008 (Nato honesty on Ukraine could avert conflict with Russia Financial Times 01/13/2022):

The dispute over Ukraine has a long vintage. As early as 1997,former Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov told his counterparts that Nato’s admission of Ukraine would cross a “red line”. When Ukraine and Georgia’s membership bids began to seem more plausible in the 2000s, Russia’s opposition became more vocal. This created a vicious cycle. The louder Moscow protested, the more determined western capitals became to deny Russia what was seen as a veto over alliance decision-making. The issue was no longer the merits of Kyiv [Ukraine] and Tbilisi’s [Georgia] bids formembership, but the perception that Russia could determinealliance policy

Events reached a peak at Nato’s Bucharest summit in 2008. The George W Bush administration had been pushing hard to grant Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans (MAPs), road maps to eventual accession [to NATO membership]. Germany and France believed that Ukraine and Georgia were not ready, but all allies wanted to avoid being seen as bowing to Russian pressure.

In an unusual compromise, allied leaders stated in a summit communiqué that Ukraine and Georgia “will become” Nato members — without saying when — but denied them MAPs. After the summit, it became clear that this declaration was the worst of all worlds. It provided no increased security to Ukraine and Georgia, but reinforced Moscow’s view that Nato was set on incorporating them. [my emphasis]