Joschka Fischer on EU relations with Russia

Former German Foreign Minister and Green Party leader Joschka Fischer published a book in 2018, Der Abstieg des Westens: Europa in der neuen Weltordnung des 21. Jahrhunderts, that took a Big Picture view of the world situation, with particular emphasis on the relations between the US, Russia, China, and the EU. He looks at some of the major options in the current world in which China is rising to be the biggest economic powers, the US no longer holds the post-1989 position of the leading power in a unipolar world order.

Fischer highlights the contrast in development between Russia and China. "China, in contrast to post-Soviet Russia, has successfully gone through five modernizations - agricultural, industrial, military, scientific and technical - while Russia has gone through only one, the military." He argues that this put Russia in a distinctively less propitious situation. And he also argues that this was the key weakness of the Soviet Union, although that may be conceding too much to American Cold War triumphalist narratives. (All the translation from the German in this post are mine.)

In light of those realities, he sees Russia's strategic situation as follows:

So Russia stands before its real strategic decision in the face of the new world order. It has three options: to remain alone in its weakness (which would isolate the country in poverty and backwardness and fall behind the time before its opening to the West under Peter the Great), Chinese junior partner, or Europe. To be sure, the Russian elite would have nothing against the European option, as long as Russia were guaranteed its prominent leadership role as a world and great power. This, however, is something that Europeans cannot accept, as it would mean subjugation, an end to trans-Atlanticism and also a reversal of the process of European integration. The European option for Russia will therefore only be possible within the framework of the new conditions created by the EU and NATO on the European continent, but this would require a profound change in mentality among the Russian elite and in the country's self-image. [my emphasis]

Fischer thinks it is important for NATO and the EU to take a firm stand against Russian military interventions in eastern Europe, especially that in Ukraine, which included the annexation of Crimea, illegal in international law. He makes the point that former Soviet countries including Ukraine should be able to make their own decisions about their relationship to Europe, include EU and NATO membership.

I suppose that a position that the EU nations need to officially take, so its no surprise that Fischer would take such a position. He dismisses Russia's concern about Ukraine joining NATO as a propaganda justification for annexing Crimea. Which I find surprising. Yes, Russia did use that as a justification. But it seems obvious that Russia even under a more European-friendly Government than Putin's would take an extremely dim view of more former Soviet countries joining NATO along with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Though it's also obvious that Russia recognizes that closer alignment with the West is a potential option for countries like Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia.

But Fischer does recognize that the Western allies would have done well to apply more strategic consideration and less Cold War triumphalism in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union:

Back then, in 1989, the West fell victim to its own ignorance and arrogance, because it was not the end of history, but only a chapter of history had come to an end, a world order had sunk, and a long process of transition to the world of tomorrow had begun. Unlike in the period of transition with the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the West, which was still dominant in 1989 – beyond the alliance systems and institutions existing in Europe, which, like NATO and the EU, were expanded to the East – no longer had the strength to design and impose a truly new global order that could meet the needs and diversity of the 21st century. The West was neither politically nor spiritually prepared for this transition process. And this finding is true to this day. [my emphasis]

Fischer frames his view of how the EU should regard Russia this way:

All these factors speak for dealing with Russia for a historically and geopolitically based, strategic patience, for perseverance and understanding of the very special status of this huge Eurasian country, but also for a determined adherence to its own fundamental values and principles. Europe must not allow itself to be frustrated or fatigued in its diplomatic and defence efforts, so as to at least contain the conflict in eastern Ukraine and prevent it from spilling over to other states in the region. This also includes sticking to Ukraine's European perspective, while at the same time using clever diplomacy to enable Russia to return to the European order of states. [my emphasis]