But the politics of the issue still creates pressure to exaggerate the short-run prospects of Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War and to engage in threat inflation around Russia.
Walter Isaacson interviewed Anne Applebaum on Amanpour and Company about the state of the Russia-Ukraine War. (1)
Applebaum is a good journalist and historian who also has worthwhile observations on the dynamics of authoritarian politics in liberal-democratic countries today. Isaacson is the first interviewer I’ve seen mentioned that she is married to Radek Sikorski, the current Foreign Minister of Poland since December 2023. Which she acknowledged with no hint of irritation or defensiveness. That’s just good journalistic practice.
That doesn’t mean we should dismiss what she’s saying or assume that she is speaking for the Polish government. It may come as a surprise to some, but husbands and wives don’t always have the same perspective on political issues. Still, it’s reasonable to assume that she is not likely to take a position on a particular issue that is sharply critical of one that Poland officially takes while her husband serves as Foreign Minister. Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania tend to be particularly hawkish about the Russian threat and tend to take a dim official view of its territorial ambitions.
Her interview also reflects the Biden Administration’s particular position, which of course is aligned with Poland’s at the moment.
Here is my transcript of the last part of the interview (with “uhs” and “you knows” edited out).
Her perspective falls broadly within the liberal-internationalist view, which we could also accurately call a liberal-imperialist view, that has been common to Democratic Administrations since 1993.
It also assumes that Russia is just on the march to take Poland and the Baltic nations as soon as it gets a chance. It’s advantageous for those countries to promote such a narrative. But if the Russians are massing an invasion force on those borders, they must be keeping it well concealed. There’s a rhetorical slight-of-hand here to act as though those countries were in the same position as Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
Ukraine was not a member of NATO and therefore not part of its mutual-defence commitment. Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are members of NATO. Unless Donald Trump should take office again, the Russia leaders know that the risks they would incur by invading a NATO member are orders of magnitude greater than the ones they have taken with Ukraine. Pretending otherwise is basically just continuing the caricatured Munich-analogy way of thinking, in which Hitler is poised to invade Czechoslovakia and the West is about to wimp out and let him start World War II.
“Liberal democracy” as a foreign policy
But the current massive US support of Israel’s Gaza war is the opposite of “defending human rights, rule of law, transparency.” Amnesty International is calling urgent attention to that current state of international law in practice, and not just on the side of Applebaum’s Bad Autocracies. (2)
That doesn’t mean we should dismiss what she’s saying or assume that she is speaking for the Polish government. It may come as a surprise to some, but husbands and wives don’t always have the same perspective on political issues. Still, it’s reasonable to assume that she is not likely to take a position on a particular issue that is sharply critical of one that Poland officially takes while her husband serves as Foreign Minister. Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania tend to be particularly hawkish about the Russian threat and tend to take a dim official view of its territorial ambitions.
Her interview also reflects the Biden Administration’s particular position, which of course is aligned with Poland’s at the moment.
Here is my transcript of the last part of the interview (with “uhs” and “you knows” edited out).
Walter Isaacson: You wrote a wonderful book in 2020, It’s a seminal book about our time which is called The Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism. And it explains why contemporary countries and even some in the West have been weak in defending the old-fashioned liberal ideals of democracy.
Do you feel that Ukraine is the front line of that fight? And, if so, how do you see this fight going over the next decade?
Applebaum: So, I do think that Ukraine is the front line in the international, the geopolitical aspect of that fight. We are now living in a world in which Russia is allied with Iran, China, Venezuela, Belarus, and other autocracies. They have different goals and different kinds of political systems but the do see themselves as aligned against democracy. And particularly against the language of democracy, human rights, rule of law, transparency.
Because those ideas, which are often the ideas used by their own internal opposition would be threatening to their form of dictatorship. And one of the reasons why Russia invaded Ukraine was because Putin wanted to show European in particular that he doesn’t care about their we-don’t-change-borders-by-force rules, or their laws on human rights, or their language [such as] “never again, we mustn’t allow mass murder to happen in Europe again” after the Second World War.
He wanted to show Europeans he doesn’t care. He can kidnap thousands of Ukrainian children, which he has done, and he’s been sentenced by the International Criminal Court for doing so. He can put Ukrainians in concentration camps. He can randomly murder Ukrainian walking down the street in occupied Ukraine.
If we really care about those ideas, if we believe that you shouldn’t be able to occupy other countries and destroy them, and change their identity, and murder their people with impunity, then, yes, this is Ukraine in that sense is the front line in a broader war.
Whether it continue further: [Russian] military into Poland and the Baltic states; whether it continues further into Africa, where there’s a large Russian presence already; whether it just means that Russia is emboldened to use its information warfare and propaganda in new ways all over the world, this [Ukraine] is a place to stop them.
Her perspective falls broadly within the liberal-internationalist view, which we could also accurately call a liberal-imperialist view, that has been common to Democratic Administrations since 1993.
It also assumes that Russia is just on the march to take Poland and the Baltic nations as soon as it gets a chance. It’s advantageous for those countries to promote such a narrative. But if the Russians are massing an invasion force on those borders, they must be keeping it well concealed. There’s a rhetorical slight-of-hand here to act as though those countries were in the same position as Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.
Ukraine was not a member of NATO and therefore not part of its mutual-defence commitment. Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are members of NATO. Unless Donald Trump should take office again, the Russia leaders know that the risks they would incur by invading a NATO member are orders of magnitude greater than the ones they have taken with Ukraine. Pretending otherwise is basically just continuing the caricatured Munich-analogy way of thinking, in which Hitler is poised to invade Czechoslovakia and the West is about to wimp out and let him start World War II.
“Liberal democracy” as a foreign policy
But the current massive US support of Israel’s Gaza war is the opposite of “defending human rights, rule of law, transparency.” Amnesty International is calling urgent attention to that current state of international law in practice, and not just on the side of Applebaum’s Bad Autocracies. (2)
Applebaum’s formulation of the liberal-internationalist view is essentially a propaganda framework. The neoconservative hawks may be notably more cynical in their insistence that spreading democracy by wars like the invasion of Iraq that blatantly violated international law are not only necessary and motivated by the goal of spreading the blessings of liberal democracy. But a lot of Democratic Party versions of this approach have too often ended in the same moral bankruptcy. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s “We think the price is worth it" moment was an infamous example of the latter. (3)
Agnès Callamard’s interview above brings to mind the famous statement of Abraham Lincoln:
What are Russia’s territorial goals in the current war with Ukraine?
The safely establishment UK defense think tank, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in February published this analysis:
Timothy Snyder recently did an interview with one of the most infamous neocons, Butcher’s Bill Kristol, in which Snyder says, “what [the Russians] tell us every day is they’re trying to destroy Ukrainian state and society. That’s their war aim. And so long as they haven’t done that, they’re going to try, they’re going to keep trying to do that on the Ukrainian side, yeah, they can sustain this for a long time.” (6) (my emphasis)
I suppose Snyder could claim that “they’re trying to destroy Ukrainian state and society” is not literally saying Russia wants to conquer all its territory. But that’s what most listeners are likely to take from it.
(Applebaum and Snyder are good weathervanes at the moment for what respectable "MSNBC liberals" are thinking about foreign policy.)
This February 2024 analysis from the Association of the US Army by Amos Fox looks at what the Russian goals can be assumed to be. It includes this graphic of outcome scenarios that would be considered victory or defeat from the Russian point of view (7):
Note that the upper left scenario represents what Fox takes to be the maximum goal of Russia at this point.
Andrew Michta of the Atlantic Council writes:
I tend to think NATO will be in something like a continuing crisis for the next few years. A war in Europe (Russia-Ukraine), a Middle East war that could expand considerably, and the international nuclear-arms limitation arrangements falling by the wayside, a “much bigger” crisis (or crises) “for the NATO alliance” is a very obvious possibility!
Michta assesses the possibilities for Ukraine in 2024 this way:
The last part is consistent with the hooray-for-the-home-team rhetoric from Ukraine and its most enthusiastic Western boosters. But getting to a position like Amos Fox’s two “defeat” scenarios from Russia’s viewpoint will be a heavy lift for Ukraine in the immediate future, and extremely hard to imagine in 2024. An armistice agreement that would leave Russia in control of Crimea and the Ukrainian eastern provinces it has (illegally) annexed would be a best-case scenario for Ukraine in 2024. And that assumes that, sometime between now and the US Presidential election, Russia and Ukraine would be willing to make such an agreement and that the US would not only be willing but also able to bring key NATO allies like France, Germany, and Poland along.
Michta’s scenario for a US policy shift this year doesn’t even include that option:
Notes:
(1) Anne Applebaum: The GOP’s Pro-Russia Caucus Lost. Now Ukraine Has to Win. Amanpour and Company YouTube channel 04/24/2024. <https://youtu.be/YqBL7Bfh_LY?si=VGDkwJwrDQB8R4oc> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(2) Global Breakdown of International Law Amid Flagrant War Crimes in Gaza & Beyond, Says Amnesty Chief. Democracy Now! YouTube channel 04/25/2024. (Accessed: <https://youtu.be/9C2vPzWhm7Y?si=B99Dfh4EjGqoehIu> 2024-25-04).
(3) Mahajan, Rahul (2001): ‘We Think the Price Is Worth It’. FAIR 11/01/2001. <https://fair.org/extra/we-think-the-price-is-worth-it/> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(4) Lincoln, Abraham (1855): Letter to Joshua F. Speed 08/24/1855. In: Van Doren Stern, Philip (1940): The Life and Writings of Abraham Lincoln, 395. New York: The Modern Library/Random House.
(5) Watling, Jack & Reynolds, Nick (2024): Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024. Royal Institute Services Institute (RUSI) 02/13/224. <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(6) Timothy Snyder on Ukraine, Russia, America—and What’s at Stake. Conversations with Bill Kristol 03/07/2024. <https://conversationswithbillkristol.org/transcript/timothy-snyder-on-ukraine-russia-america-and-whats-at-stake/> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(7) Fox, Amos C. (2024): The Russo-Ukrainian War: A Strategic Assessment Two Years Into the Conflict. AUSA (Association of the United States Army) 02/20/2024. <https://www.ausa.org/publications/russo-ukrainian-war-strategic-assessment-two-years-conflict> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(8) Michta, Andrew (2024): The war in Ukraine could reach a decision point by the NATO summit. Policymakers need to prepare now. Atlantic Council 04/23/2024. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-war-in-ukraine-could-reach-a-decision-point-by-the-nato-summit/> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
Agnès Callamard’s interview above brings to mind the famous statement of Abraham Lincoln:
Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation, we began by declaring that 'all men are created equal.' We now practically read it 'all men are created equal, except negroes.' When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read 'all men are created equal, except negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics.' When it comes to this I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty – to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy. (4) [my emphasis]
What are Russia’s territorial goals in the current war with Ukraine?
The safely establishment UK defense think tank, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in February published this analysis:
Russia still maintains the strategic objective of bringing about the subjugation of Ukraine. It now believes that it is winning. Surrender terms currently being proposed by Russian intermediaries include Ukraine ceding the territory already under Russian control along with Kharkiv, and in some versions Odessa; agreeing not to join NATO; and maintaining a head of state approved by Russia. The only significant concession Russia proposes is that what is left of Ukraine can join the EU.Serious request: if someone has a legitimate source that specifies a statement by the Russian government or senior officials that says explicitly that their goal is to take all of Ukraine, please put the reference in the comments. Because it has become a standard talking point for New Cold War hawks that Russia has repeatedly stated explicitly that its goal is to conquer all of Ukraine. But I’ve so far not been able such a reference. Grumpy “realist” John Mearsheimer has been saying repeatedly that he has not seen any such explicit statement. And he does keep up with these things. We certainly shouldn’t assume that Putin’s government doesn’t keep some of its goals secrets. But “explicit” means, well, explicit.
The process by which Russia aims to bring about this outcome is in three stages. The first requires the continuation of pressure along the length of the Ukrainian front to drain the Armed Forces of Ukraine's (AFU) munitions and reserves of personnel. Parallel to this effort, the Russian Special Services are tasked with breaking the resolve of Ukraine's international partners to continue to provide military aid. Once military aid has been significantly limited such that Ukrainian munition stocks become depleted, Russia intends to initiate further offensive operations to make significant – if slow – gains on the battlefield. These gains are then intended to be used as leverage against Kyiv to force capitulation on Russian terms. The planning horizon for the implementation of these objectives, which is providing the baseline for Russian force generation and industrial outputs, is that victory should be achieved by 2026.
It is vital to appreciate that Russian goals may expand with success, and given that the Kremlin has violated almost all significant agreements both with Ukraine and NATO, there is no assurance that even if Russia got what it wanted out of negotiations it would not subsequently endeavour to physically occupy the rest of Ukraine or be emboldened to use force elsewhere. (5)
Timothy Snyder recently did an interview with one of the most infamous neocons, Butcher’s Bill Kristol, in which Snyder says, “what [the Russians] tell us every day is they’re trying to destroy Ukrainian state and society. That’s their war aim. And so long as they haven’t done that, they’re going to try, they’re going to keep trying to do that on the Ukrainian side, yeah, they can sustain this for a long time.” (6) (my emphasis)
I suppose Snyder could claim that “they’re trying to destroy Ukrainian state and society” is not literally saying Russia wants to conquer all its territory. But that’s what most listeners are likely to take from it.
(Applebaum and Snyder are good weathervanes at the moment for what respectable "MSNBC liberals" are thinking about foreign policy.)
This February 2024 analysis from the Association of the US Army by Amos Fox looks at what the Russian goals can be assumed to be. It includes this graphic of outcome scenarios that would be considered victory or defeat from the Russian point of view (7):
Note that the upper left scenario represents what Fox takes to be the maximum goal of Russia at this point.
Andrew Michta of the Atlantic Council writes:
Russia has launched its third major mobilization wave in anticipation of its upcoming spring/summer campaign to take more land in Ukraine. …The Ukrainian draft age is 25?
There are various assessments about the extent to which the Russian land forces have been reconstituted since Russia’s initial losses, with some analysts arguing that the process is nearly complete. But regardless of these various assessments, the gap between Russia’s and Ukraine’s military capabilities—and the difference in sheer mass—continues to grow apace, even though Kyiv recently lowered the draft age for Ukrainian males from twenty-seven to twenty-five. [my emphasis] (7)
Recent frontline gains by Russia, along with US aid to Ukraine moving forward in Congress only after months of delays, suggest that a major decision point in the war may be approaching in the coming months. While the US House of Representatives at last agreed on Saturday to send $60.8 billion in aid to Ukraine, which means the United States could soon be sending desperately needed ammunition and air defenses to the front lines, a Russian push already appears to be in its early stages. And it could well create a crisis for the NATO alliance much bigger than the current grumbling over who is spending more on Ukraine’s behalf. [my emphasis]
I tend to think NATO will be in something like a continuing crisis for the next few years. A war in Europe (Russia-Ukraine), a Middle East war that could expand considerably, and the international nuclear-arms limitation arrangements falling by the wayside, a “much bigger” crisis (or crises) “for the NATO alliance” is a very obvious possibility!
Michta assesses the possibilities for Ukraine in 2024 this way:
Given the perceived stalemate on land, and despite clear Ukrainian gains at sea, some analysts today are indeed coming to the view that the war in Ukraine is heading for a negotiated settlement. In such a hypothetical settlement, Ukraine would preserve its sovereignty and independence while Russia keeps its territorial gains in the east, plus Crimea. Setting aside the fact that such an outcome would be tantamount to a Russian victory [a view in keeping with that of Alex Fox described above], these predictions could be undone by developments on the ground, much as the prevailing view in early 2022 that Ukraine would fall fast and resort to guerrilla operations was invalidated by Kyiv’s staunch resolve to stand its ground and fight. So, rather than incessantly speculating about this or that territorial settlement or this or that negotiated deal, what Ukraine and the transatlantic community need most urgently is a shared vision of victory in Ukraine, one that Kyiv and its supporters can rally around. Next, the United States and its allies and partners need a strategy—with resources to match—that will allow Ukraine to achieve that victory. After all, to rephrase a cliché, visions without resources are merely hallucinations. [my emphasis]
The last part is consistent with the hooray-for-the-home-team rhetoric from Ukraine and its most enthusiastic Western boosters. But getting to a position like Amos Fox’s two “defeat” scenarios from Russia’s viewpoint will be a heavy lift for Ukraine in the immediate future, and extremely hard to imagine in 2024. An armistice agreement that would leave Russia in control of Crimea and the Ukrainian eastern provinces it has (illegally) annexed would be a best-case scenario for Ukraine in 2024. And that assumes that, sometime between now and the US Presidential election, Russia and Ukraine would be willing to make such an agreement and that the US would not only be willing but also able to bring key NATO allies like France, Germany, and Poland along.
Michta’s scenario for a US policy shift this year doesn’t even include that option:
In the coming months, the Biden administration could change course on Ukraine. If the Russians advance in Ukraine, the administration would have two choices: stay the course and increase the risk of Ukrainian losses, or shift from a “for as long as it takes” policy to an approach of “whatever the Ukrainians need to beat the Russians back.” This would potentially increase the risk of escalation with Russia, but it would also deflect the electoral risk of being blamed for the failure of US policy in Ukraine, while giving Kyiv a fighting chance to reach a favorable position from which to negotiate. [my emphasis]Estimations of Donald Trump’s chance of being elected as President again in November will also have an influence on what the leaders of Ukraine and Russia and also the Biden Administration think of as an optimal diplomatic strategy. The careless Russia-Russia-Russia narrative the Democrats use against Trump is clumsy at best, though it’s probably that Trump has some kind of admiration for Putin’s authoritarianism. But Trump is also looking at who is offering him the most appealing bribes. And in many ways he’s a proverbial loose cannon on the ship deck.
Notes:
(1) Anne Applebaum: The GOP’s Pro-Russia Caucus Lost. Now Ukraine Has to Win. Amanpour and Company YouTube channel 04/24/2024. <https://youtu.be/YqBL7Bfh_LY?si=VGDkwJwrDQB8R4oc> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(2) Global Breakdown of International Law Amid Flagrant War Crimes in Gaza & Beyond, Says Amnesty Chief. Democracy Now! YouTube channel 04/25/2024. (Accessed: <https://youtu.be/9C2vPzWhm7Y?si=B99Dfh4EjGqoehIu> 2024-25-04).
(3) Mahajan, Rahul (2001): ‘We Think the Price Is Worth It’. FAIR 11/01/2001. <https://fair.org/extra/we-think-the-price-is-worth-it/> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(4) Lincoln, Abraham (1855): Letter to Joshua F. Speed 08/24/1855. In: Van Doren Stern, Philip (1940): The Life and Writings of Abraham Lincoln, 395. New York: The Modern Library/Random House.
(5) Watling, Jack & Reynolds, Nick (2024): Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024. Royal Institute Services Institute (RUSI) 02/13/224. <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(6) Timothy Snyder on Ukraine, Russia, America—and What’s at Stake. Conversations with Bill Kristol 03/07/2024. <https://conversationswithbillkristol.org/transcript/timothy-snyder-on-ukraine-russia-america-and-whats-at-stake/> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(7) Fox, Amos C. (2024): The Russo-Ukrainian War: A Strategic Assessment Two Years Into the Conflict. AUSA (Association of the United States Army) 02/20/2024. <https://www.ausa.org/publications/russo-ukrainian-war-strategic-assessment-two-years-conflict> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
(8) Michta, Andrew (2024): The war in Ukraine could reach a decision point by the NATO summit. Policymakers need to prepare now. Atlantic Council 04/23/2024. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-war-in-ukraine-could-reach-a-decision-point-by-the-nato-summit/> (Accessed: 2024-25-04).
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